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Berenson and Connoisseurship - Who is Afraid 
of Art History?
Bernard Berenson belonged, as we all know, to the circle of the most distin­
guished connoisseurs of the Italian painting of the 14th-16th centuries, if we 
accept the notion of “connoisseurship” in its 19th-century sense, the epoch of 
Morelli, Frizzoni and Berenson himself.1 In 1963 James S. Ackermann and 
Rhys Carpenter, the authors of a fine introduction to the issues of art history 
and archaeology, still maintained that two great catalogues prepared by Ber­
enson, “The Drawings of the Italian Painters” (1903) and “The Pictures of the 
Renaissance” (1932), could be regarded as a very convenient starting point 
for the study of Italian painting.2 Berenson was admired for his unusual, 
inimitable gift of seeing, his visual judgement eluding any rational explana­
tions which was so strikingly described by Richard Wollheim, paraphrasing 
Cezanne: “Berenson is an eye only, but what an eye!” And John Pope-Hennesy 
called him emphatically “the most sensitive precise instrument that has ever 
been applied to the study of Italian art”.3
1 Compare: MAGINNIS (1990), 104-117.
2 ACKERMANN/CARPENTER (1963), 188, 207.
3 Cited from SUTTON (1987), 817.
NrPn th18 issue, among many publications, see for example: KLENZE (1906), 207-274; - BORE- 
IUS (1923), 264-268; - BRAND (1957); - HASKELL (1976); - GOMBRICH (2002).
It is clear, nevertheless, that the influence of such a personality as Be­
renson’s, went far beyond narrow territories of connoisseurship. Four tiny 
books, published in 1894-1907, devoted to Italian Renaissance painting, 
contributed very heavily to the completing of the “silent taste reform”,4 re­
storing full citizenship rights to the Quattrocento painters, even demanding 
that the paintings of Cosimo Tura or Piero della Francesca should be valued 
more highly than those of Raphael or Michelangelo, because the latter had 
lost from their range of vision the primal and primeval tasks of the art of 
Painting - realizing “tactile values” and transmitting “life-enhancing values”, 
whatever this might have meant. The above-mentioned four essays came to 
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be referred to, ironically, as Berenson’s “Four Gospels”. And so they were 
indeed; if one were to compare what could be poorly described as the “theo­
retical armoury” of those considerations on Italian painting with his ideas in 
“Aesthetics and History”, published half a century later (1948), one would not 
be able to observe any difference in his theoretical concepts - “tactile values”, 
“space-composition”, “movement”, “significant line” got stuck in the same 
places like truths revealed that could not be discussed any further. This ob­
durate theoretical conservatism on the part of Berenson meant that his ideas 
came to be of only minor importance, just like his views on the psychology 
of the perception of art forms after the Second World War. Yet the “Four 
Gospels” contributed to his fame and popularity as much as his relationships 
with the European establishment in the broadest sense of the word, such as 
his services to Isabella Stewart Gardner or his cooperation with the Duveen 
brothers, which was to bring him great financial success as well as never­
ending accusations.5 There was no mere self-flattery in Berenson’s remark 
that almost all Italian pictures that came to America “had my visa on their 
passports”.
6 On this see: SIMPSON (1987), but his severe accusations seem to be untenable; comPar 
FREEDBERG (1989), 7-16.
6 On this see CALO (1994).
It cannot be denied that the akme of Berenson’s popularity was in the 
1950s, when he became the real seer of Settignano - President Truman paid 
a visit to him, and the photograph of Berenson taken at the I Tatti appeared 
in LIFE magazine. If a little frivolous comparison can be forgiven, the BB 
initials in these years were as easily recognizable as the BB - Brigitte Bardot - 
of the 1960s. A supposition may be ventured that Berenson’s fame and popu­
larity were a simple consequence of a fact that he never became an academic 
art historian, or a connoisseur in a strictly professional sense. What is more, 
he never wanted to become one of them. Berenson not only did not like 
academic art history, he also despised a certain profile of art history that he 
dubbed “Teutonic”. This happened only after the massacres of the First World 
War. That Berenson violently rejected the art historical paradigm descending 
from Germany had its roots in his aesthetic attitude, shaped under the spell 
of English “aesthetic movement”, as well as in the project of a cultured and 
civilized life that he elaborated. The enjoyment of art was to be an axis of such 
an existence.
One can be easily persuaded that Berenson’s aversion towards modern 
art history equalled his aversion towards modern art.6 Berenson’s character 
surely played a role here - his tongue was legendary, spiteful, even venom­
ous. It is no surprise then, that modern art was given the name of “Unkunst , 
which is very telling, and modern artists were given such “tender” epithets as 
“contortionist”, “distortionist”, “difformist”, “inflationist”, “deflationnist’, an 
so on. Sometimes, it should be noted, it was even worse; Josef Strzyg°ws 1 
was bestowed with the title of “Attila of art history”. This strong dislike that
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Berenson had for modern art was partly caused by his conviction that art qua 
art should not be allowed to trespass beyond the borders of representation 
and visible world, and that the representation of the human figure was the 
most perfect subject and a test of artistic capability at the same time. This, as 
it were, pseudo-Renaissance dogma, with its invectives hurled without meas­
ure against modern art, brings to mind associations with Hans Sedlmayr’s 
manifesto “Verlust der Mitte”. And although no other than Meyer Schapiro 
admitted that Berenson’s unflagging admiration for antique perfection placed 
him somehow close to the adherents of heroic nudity, such associations would 
be superficial only.7 In Berenson’s writings one can find neither the gloomy 
catastrophism of Sedlmayr, nor the quasi-religious aura wrapping Sedlmayr’s 
critique of modern art. It can be said, to avoid any misunderstanding, that they 
both found something else in the heritage of “romantic art metaphysics”.
Let me recall, then, some well-known facts. Berenson’s conception of ar­
tistic form had a physiological-psychological base, and the conceptual vocabu­
lary used by him came from the writings of Friedrich Theodor Vischer and 
Adolf von Hildebrand. The most important notion, that of “tactile values”, set
not only the aim and quality of Renaissance painting, especially in Florence 
(Firenze), but also the “modus” of organizing the world depicted, operating at 
the level of both every-day experience and artistic experience, and linked to 
the problem of perception of space and three-dimensionality of human figures 
and objects in the world. Berenson writes: “painting is an art which aims at 
giving an abiding impression of artistic reality with only two dimensions. The 
painter must, therefore, do consciously what all we do unconsciously - con­
struct his third dimension. And he can accomplish his task only as we ac­
complish ours, by giving tactile values to retinal impressions”.8 Fulfilling this 
task is a condition of achieving “an abiding impression of artistic reality”. But 
such a perception cannot be realized without putting into motion the haptic 
imagination of the beholder. This is how it comes to the co-operation of artist 
with beholder in the process of grasping the monumental figure of Giotto’s 
Madonna: “Our eyes scarcely have had time to light on it before we realize it 
completely - the throne occupying a real space, the Virgin satisfactorily seated
uPon it, the angels grouped in rows about it. Our tactile imagination is put 
to play immediately. Our palms and fingers accompany our eyes much more
Quickly than in presence of real objects, the sensations varying constantly 
With the various projections represented as of face, torso, knees; confirming
in every way our feeling of capacity for coping with things - for life, in short”.9 
One can mention here in passing that in historical perspective “tactile values”
and “coping with things” are a kind of a psychological transcription of Vasarian 
ormulas that resounded like a refrain. Berenson owed to him much more
' SCHAPIRO (1961), 57-65.
" berenson (i968), 63.
’ berenson (1968), 70.
230 Ryszard Kasperowicz
than he would be ever ready to admit. But, in an ironical comment made by 
Michael Baxandall, Vasari spoke about pictures, Berenson always about his 
own feelings and sensations.10 It is obvious in the end that the real aim of 
painting is to express “life-enhancing values”. Berenson never fully explained 
what these “life-enhancing values” were supposed to mean. He understood 
them possibly as a go-between, a bridge connecting the area of sense percep­
tion, endowed with a certain vitalist character, with a quasi-mystical moment 
of unity with nature through art, with the moment of freeing oneself from 
the flow of time. To this peculiar experience Berenson gave various cryptic 
descriptions, willingly using Goethe’s words: “Dahin! Dahin!”11
10 BAXANDALL (1988), 122.
11 Compare: BERENSON (1991), 102.
12 SAMUELS (1979), 384.
Naturally, this sounded perfectly in accord with the image Berenson had 
of himself - as a keeper of humanistic traditions. In the utopian-historical 
perspective all that was born in the area of the Mediterranean: art works, 
the way of feeling nature, the style of being, the whole oikoumene, in short, 
built the dream of Berenson’s “House of Life”. The “House of Life” is a to­
talizing cultural project in which art and poetry have a deeply humanizing 
effect on a man, allowing him to walk over the boundaries of ethnic, national 
and cultural prejudices - “tribal” behaviour in Berenson’s vocabulary. Quite
in the spirit of Schiller, although without his proposed ethical obligations 
derived from Kant’s practical philosophy, culture is to heal the wounds done 
by culture itself. For Berenson culture becomes also a synonym of freedom, 
and its condition is something close to erasing old, harmful identity. This 
is a characteristic report by Berenson of a meeting in international society, 
plenty of which can be found in Berenson’s memories: “Bernhard and Mary 
relished the fact that they were part of ‘a civilization’ that brings together, 
a Spaniard-Creole [Countess Serristori], a Russian Jew [Bernhard], a Pole 
[Count Rambelinski], and a Philadelphia Quaker [Mary] and enables them 
to pass three days together in perfect harmony, agreeing upon pretty nearly 
every subject”.12
Berenson’s “House of Life” is an attempt to broaden the concept of Walter 
Pater’s House of Beauty, so that it could embrace all aspects of living. The 
very expression has a curious genealogy since it comes from the religi°uS 
moralizing of Bunyan’s writings, an obligatory reading for any pious man m 
Great Britain. Thanks to Charles Lamb it became part of the artistic litera­
ture of the Victorian era. The “House of Life” is an imagined world of culture, 
a large room where the most eminent works of the human mind stay side by 
side, pointing mutually one to another. The task of any human being is t0 
deepen continuously the consciousness of historical connections with culture, 
untiringly experiencing the aesthetic moment given to us in a “short interva 
of time. The critic’s aim becomes then fully distanced but possibly the mos 
Berenson and Connoisseurship 231
meticulous analysis of his own sensations and feelings on seeing a picture or 
listening to a piece of music. And only this really counts in life.13
13 See: COURT (1983) 16-22; - SUTTON (1964), 176-182.
14 BERENSON (1968), 110, 112.
15 SAMUELS (1987), 402-403.
16 BERENSON (1963), 390-391.
Although Pater became an object of derision, his convoluted prose de­
scribed as “perfumed” and additionally blamed for its apparent amorality, 
Berenson followed him faithfully. It is true that he was not received at Pa­
ter’s seminar, but to the end of his life he preserved his conviction that life 
was worth living with art above all, experiencing its productions according 
to Pater’s prescription - to perceive art works in a manner similar to the 
detached perception of music, surrendering to its power of expression. The 
fragment on Botticelli shows this at best: “Look, for instance, at Botticelli’s 
‘Venus Rising from the Sea’. Throughout, the tactile imagination is roused to 
a keen activity, by itself almost as life-heightening as music. But the power of 
music is even surpassed where, as in the goddess’s mane-like tresses of hair 
fluttering to the wind, not in disorderly rout but in masses yielding only after 
resistance, the movement is directly life-communicating. [...] imagine an art 
made up entirely of these quintessences of movement-values, and you will 
have something that holds the same relation to representation that music 
holds to speech [...]”.14
The postulate that the products of visual art should have musical quali­
ties was well known to romantic art theories; it presupposes two points: first, 
the purity of perception and, second, the immediacy of expression. Here, one 
might suppose, lie the causes of Berenson’s deep reluctance to interpreting 
art works according to the paradigm proposed by Panofsky or other art his­
torians espousing a similar methodology. In Berenson’s catalogue of enemies 
Panofsky took a very eminent position; iconography Berenson re-christened 
into “icononsense”, Panofsky became “a Hitler of art study”.15 Berenson was 
convinced that historical erudition, the presentation of the broadest possible 
cultural context, and the disentangling of symbolic riddles and mysteries, 
are the worst threat, in that they annihilate real, authentic contact with art. 
An entry in Berenson’s diary from 1955, four years before his death, can be 
seen as his aesthetic confession, as his life-long credo: “What do they [i.e. art 
historians] want? That the work of art should remain unenjoyed and serve 
only as a ‘cadaver’ for anatomizing, or as subject matter for meta-phussics, 
Freudian interpretations, or as a stimuli for Re-search?”16 This citation irre­
sistibly brings to mind a famous sentence by William Wordsworth: “We mur­
der to dissect”. But now it is obvious, I suppose, that aesthetic epicureanism 
of Berenson, deeply immersed in the post-romantic theory of art work, freed 
from, as Berenson would say, “meta-phussics”, was a direct and thorough 
contradiction of the practices used by a connoisseur. A connoisseur has to 
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treat the work as an atom, he has to isolate and autonomise those elements 
that are functional from the point of view of vestigial analysis, so to speak. 
A connoisseur, at least in Berenson’s eyes, is interested in the cutting up of a 
work considered to be a symptom of authentic psychological activity of a painter - 
and this is self-evident, since a connoisseur strives to make attributions. The 
case of “Amico di Sandro” shows clearly that the isolation of particular aspects 
of an artwork in the context of biographical continuity and the typical traits 
of a personal style may lead to the temptation of inventing of a non-existent 
artistic personality. Yet for Berenson himself such a model of connoisseurship 
seems to be insufficient - although he himself tried to systematize the elements 
forming the structure of a work. This structure does not consist simply of the 
shape of a palm or hand, a profile of an ear or winding of draperies. It arises 
due to the mastering of tactile values or significant line, due to the capability of 
restraining emotions (Piero della Francesca) or of confining oneself to the pure 
architectural tectonics of a picture (Antonello da Messina).
It can be said that for Berenson an impassive, cold connoisseur, analyz­
ing form like an entomologist, will stay blind for authentic artistic values 
if they do not possess this capability to awake within themselves tactile 
imagination and to arouse the feeling for an art work as a whole. And, vice 
versa, the enjoyment of “life-enhancing values”, if not helped by the histori­
cal consciousness of a connoisseur, will be an empty gesture; the universe of 
pure, perfect form qua form has only hypothetical, potential existence, and 
always is to be rooted in a concrete artistic biography and stylistic stance. 
The cult of the fragment, characteristic of the connoisseur, and the vitalistic 
aesthetics of fullness, are the heritage of a post-Romantic art theory, filtered 
through Victorian sensibility and an adoring respect for sheer architecture of 
forms of Quattrocento painting. But for the romantic religion of art Berenson 
substituted his vision of pure, impersonal form; where the romantics detected 
the presence of transcendence, Berenson preferred to speak of something 
numinotical, always in a close, immediate relationship with life conceived as 
a totality of experience. When in one of his letters Berenson chided Millard 
Meiss that “Sie sind ein ‘Warburgianer’ geworden”,17 he also meant this loss 
of vital connection between art and life. It remains an open question as to 
whether one can be a connoisseur today, or an eager believer in the Paterian 
ideal of the musicality of the visual artwork. Berenson seemed to be both at 
once, without feeling any inner tension or contradiction. But then one would 
have to be another Berenson.
17 This quotation after: WUTTKE (1996), II, 645.
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Streszczenie: Berenson i znawstwo - kto si? boi historii sztuki?
Bernard Berenson byl jednym z najslynniejszych i najwazniejszych koneserow 
w dziejach historii sztuki; przyczynil si? wydatnie nie tylko do rozwi^zania 
wielu zagadek atrybucyjnych, ale tez do gruntownej zmiany smaku w pierw- 
szej polowie wieku XX. Dzi?ki jego tzw. Czterem Ewangeliom zakohczyl si? 
dlugi okres, kiedy to uprzywilejowane miejsce w dziejach sztuki renesansowej 
przyznawano malarzom Quattrocenta.
Najwazniejsze osi^gni?cia Berensona w zakresie znawstwa byly wyni- 
kiem przede wszystkim jego nieslychanej subtelnosci, doskonalej pami?ci 
wzrokowej i przenikliwosci w analizowaniu form dziel sztuki. Teoretyczne 
podstawy jego wlasnej wersji znawstwa, choc podejmowal proby ich wyjas- 
nienia, nie ujawniaj^ zrodel jego dokonari albo wplywow, jakie zyskal w zyciu 
publicznym. Berenson z podejrzliwosci^ i rosn^c^ niech?ci^ obserwowal po- 
st?py nowoczesnej historii sztuki. Wydaje si?, ze przyczyn^ tego byla niezgod- 
nosc postawy estetycznej Berensona — uksztaltowanej pod wplywem tradycji 
estetyzmu angielskiego, kontynentalnej psychologii sztuki oraz jego wlasnego 
postrzegania dziel sztuki - z teoretycznymi propozycjami akademickiej histo­
rii sztuki, ktora podkreslala rol? historii w objasnianiu dziel. Poza tym w kr?- 
gach historykow sztuki zjawiskom estetycznym przypisywano zupelnie inne 
miejsce. Strach Berensona przed historic sztuki pokazuje w sposob sympto- 
matyczny problemy i w^tpliwosci, z jakimi borykali si? krytycy i historycy 
sztuki pod koniec XIX i w pierwszej polowie XX stulecia.
